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Introduction	
	In	the	U.S.,	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	was	caused	by	a	lack	of	understanding	of	the	implications	of	households	committing	to	use	future	incomes	for	a	purchase	of	a	 home.	 Committing	 future	 income	 flows	 to	 acquire	 goods	 and	 services	 in	 the	current	 period	 requires	 households	 to	 make	 a	 judgment	 about	 future	 interest	rates,	 about	 the	 household’s	 ability	 to	 earn	 an	 income	 in	 future	 years,	 about	 a	possible	 future	state	of	health	and	about	growth	 in	 income	 levels	and	changes	 in	future	 inflation	 levels:	 a	 near	 impossible	 task!	 On	 top	 of	 this,	 households	 have	absolutely	no	control	over	the	amounts	other	households	borrow,	notwithstanding	that	 such	 collective	 borrowings	 can	 have	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 the	 shift	 from	 an	income	based	financing	to	borrowing	against	the	values	of	the	assets:	the	homes.		The	 choice	 –demand-	 for	 goods	 and	 services	 is	 infinitely	 simpler	 when	 current	income	is	being	used	to	buy	such	items.	 If	only	current	 income	is	being	used,	the	choices	of	what	to	buy	are	limited	by	the	level	of	income	and	savings.		Economic	 theories	 and	 economic	 models	 have	 given	 too	 little	 weight	 to	 the	difference	between	committing	current	or	future	incomes.	It	is	not	just	individual	households	 who	 have	 to	 struggle	 with	 such	 a	 choice;	 also	 governments	 have	 to	make	such	judgments	in	their	spending	behavior.		This	paper	will	 focus	on	the	mortgage	borrowing	 levels	 in	the	United	States	over	the	period	1996-2016.	The	paper	will	examine	the	factors	that	drive	the	supply	of	funds	 as	 the	 supply	 side	 totally	 determines	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 mortgage	borrowing	 levels.	 Households	 are	 for	 100%	 dependent	 on	 the	 willingness	 of	lenders	 to	commit	 funds.	The	major	drawback	of	 this	dependency	 is	 that	 lenders	not	 only	 find	 their	 security	 in	 future	 households’	 income	 levels,	 but	 also	 in	 the	values	of	the	assets:	the	homes	being	financed.	As	this	paper	will	demonstrate,	the	volume	of	funds	lend	can	and	often	does	affect	the	price	developments	of	all	homes	and	 it	 is	 thereby	a	 factor	which	can	cause	a	major	deviation	 from	the	only	 factor	which	matters:	the	ability	of	households	to	repay	such	mortgage	borrowings	out	of	future	income	levels.		As	 the	 statistics	 will	 show,	 the	 financial	 crisis	 for	 U.S.	 individual	 households	already	happened	in	2003,	long	before	the	banking	crisis	of	2007-2008.											
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1.	The	key	questions		
1.1	Setting	the	framework	
	The	U.S.	housing	market	is	in	many	aspects	similar	to	any	other	market:	there	is	a	supply	and	a	demand	level	for	homes	as	well	as	a	market	price.	What	is	different	from	most	markets	is	that	for	many	buyers	the	costs	of	a	home	exceed	their	income	and	 savings	 levels	 by	 a	 substantial	margin.	Hence	 a	 large	number	 of	 buyers	will	have	to	use	borrowed	funds	in	order	to	acquire	a	home.		Buyers	 will	 know	 that	 their	 ability	 to	 repay	 their	 mortgage	 has	 to	 come	 out	 of	future	 income;	 the	 income	 affordability	 test.	 The	mortgage	 providers	 will	 know	this	 also,	 but	 in	 addition	 they	 require	 a	 claim	on	a	property	 in	 case	 the	buyer	 is	unable	to	service	the	mortgage.		What	makes	 the	housing	market	different	 from	other	markets	 is	 that	 the	market	price	for	all	homes	is	not	only	determined	by	demand	–the	need	for	homes	based	on	population	 growth,	 the	number	 of	 new	households,	 changes	 in	 taste	 patterns	and	the	annual	write	off	of	a	small	number	of	homes-	but	equally	by	the	volume	of	funds	 –especially	 borrowed	 funds-	 allocated	 to	 the	 housing	 market	 per	 time	period.		What	the	collective	of	lenders	can	achieve	and	no	mortgage	borrower	can	prevent	is	that	the	volume	of	funds	allocated	to	the	housing	market	in	any	single	year	can	drive	 up	 the	market	 price	 of	 all	 homes,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 borrowers	 ability	 to	service	 mortgage	 debt.	 It	 establishes	 an	 asset	 value	 rather	 than	 an	 income	affordability	based	method	of	finance.		The	 only	 and	 ultimate	 test	 to	 the	 soundness	 of	 the	 U.S.	 housing	 market	 and	implicitly	 to	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 whether	 individual	 households	 can	repay	 their	mortgage	obligations	out	 of	 future	 income	 levels.	 The	 financial	 crisis	occurred	because	this	simple	truth	was	overshadowed	by	the	asset-based	method	of	 financing,	 inflating	 house	 prices	 beyond	 the	 capacity	 of	 households	 to	 service	their	mortgage	debts	or	pay	the	inflated	rents.	For	U.S.	individual	households	their	financial	 crisis	 already	occurred	 in	2003,	 long	before	 the	banking	 crisis	of	2007-2008.		A	good	 illustration	of	 the	 impact	on	the	U.S.	housing	market	 that	 the	asset	based	finance	 method	 has	 had	 over	 the	 income	 affordability	 one	 has	 been	 set	 out	 in	section	1.2	with	the	help	of	statistics	covering	the	period	from	1996-2016.					
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1.2	 Statistical	 evidence	of	what	happened	 in	 the	U.S.	 housing	markets	 over	
the	period	1996-2016	
	
Table	1:	The	developments	of	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending,	the	annual	housing	starts,	the	average	U.S.	home	sales	price,	the	nominal	median	income	of	households	and	U.S.	home	sale	prices	based	on	such	incomes					
	
Year	
	
									1	
Volume	of	
Home	mortgage	
Lending	
X	U.S.$	billion	
	
						2	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	thousands	
							3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
					4	
Median	
Household	
Nominal	
Income	
X	U.S.	dollars	
							5	
Income	
Affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
1996	 				329	 1370	 166,400	 35,492	 	
1997	 			341	 1566	 176,200	 37,005	 173,494	
1998	 			437	 1792	 181,900	 38,885	 182,308	
1999	 				524	 1708	 195,600	 40,696	 190,798	
2000	 			544	 1532	 207,000	 41,990	 196,864	
2001	 			685	 1568	 213,200	 42,228	 197,980	
2002	 			907	 1788	 228,700	 42,409	 198,828	
2003	 	1112	 2057	 246,300	 43,318	 203,089	
2004	 	1211	 2042	 274,500	 44,334	 207,852	
2005	 	1351	 1994	 297,000	 46,326	 217,233	
2006	 	1327	 1649	 305,900	 48,201	 226,025	
2007	 	1057	 1037	 313,600	 50,233	 235,553	
2008	 			319	 		560	 292,600	 50,303	 235,881	
2009	 			186	 		581	 270,900	 49,777	 233,414	
2010	 	-167	 		539	 272,900	 49,276	 231,065	
2011	 			104	 		694	 263,400	 50,054	 234,713	
2012	 			105	 		976	 285,400	 51,017	 239,229	
2013	 				223	 1010	 319,300	 53,585	 251,271	
2014	 				312	 1081	 312,500	 53,657	 251,609	
2015	 				407	 1160	 352,500	 56,516	 265,015	
2016	 				596	 1226	 384,000	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		With	the	help	of	table	1,	two	more	statistics	can	be	developed:	the	annual	number	of	housing	starts	that	could	have	been	made	if	house	prices	had	developed	in	line	with	 income	 earning	 capacities	 of	 the	 U.S.	 population.	 The	 second	 statistics	compares	the	gap	between	the	average	home	sales	price	and	the	affordable	house	price,	 based	 on	 income	 growth	 levels.	 This	 gap	 reflects	 the	 switch	 from	 income	based	financing	to	an	asset	based	one.				
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Table	2	Comparison	between	income	and	asset	based	house	financing	
	
Year	 Income	
Affordability	
Housing	
Starts	
x	thousands	
Actual	housing	
Starts	
X	thousands	
Year	 Income	
Affordability	
Housing	
Starts	
x	thousands	
Actual	housing	
Starts	
X	thousands	
1996	 	 1370	 2006	 5871	 1649	
1997	 1965	 1566	 2007	 4487	
	
1037	
1998	 2397	 1792	 2008	 1352	
	
	560	
1999	 2746	 1708	 2009	 		797	
	
	581	
2000	 2763	 1532	 2010	 							0	
	
	539	
2001	 3460	 1568	 2011	 		443	
	
	694	
2002	 4466	 1788	 2012	 		439	
	
	976	
2003	 5475	 2057	 2013	 		887	
	
1010	
2004	 5826	 2042	 2014	 1240	
	
1081	
2005	 6219	 1994	 2015	 1536	
	
1160	
	
	
Table	3	Comparison	between	average	home	sales	price	and	income	based	house	prices		
	
Year	 Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
Price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
Income	
affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
Year	 Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
Price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
Income	
affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
1997	
	
176,200	 173,494	 2006	 305,900	 226,025	
1998	
	
181,900	 182,308	 2007	 313,600	 235,553	
1999	
	
195,600	 190,798	 2008	 292,600	 235,881	
2000	
	
207,000	 196,864	 2009	 270,900	 233,414	
2001	
	
213,200	 197,980	 2010	 272,900	 231,065	
2002	
	
228,700	 198,828	 2011	 263,400	 234,713	
2003	
	
246,300	 203,089	 2012	 285,400	 239,229	
2004	
	
274,500	 207,852	 2013	 319,300	 251,271	
2005	 297,000	 217,233	 2014	
	
2015	
312,500	
	
352,500	
251,609	
	
265,015	
	
	The	sources	and	the	methodology	of	the	data	used	are	explained	in	section	5.	
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2.	The	speed	of	mortgage	lending,	the	U.S.	example.	
	
	
2.1	The	choice	between	an	income	or	asset	based	mortgage	lending	system	
		The	choice	between	an	income	or	asset	based	mortgage	lending	system	is	made	by	the	suppliers	of	funds:	the	lenders.	Their	collective	action	of	mortgage	lending	can	have	 two	 totally	 different	 effects.	 If,	 for	 2003,	 the	 volume	 of	 lending	was	 solely	restricted	 to	 follow	 the	 income	 earning	 capacity	 of	 the	 borrowers,	 then	 -as	 the	calculations	in	above	statistics	showed-	the	mortgage	volume	needed	to	built	about	1.6	 million	 homes	 would	 have	 been	 $325	 billion.	 Instead	 $1.112	 trillion	 was	provided	 as	 new	 mortgages.	 The	 extra	 $787	 billion	 was	 used	 to	 drive	 up	 the	average	house	price	to	$246,300	rather	than	the	$203,089	one;	the	latter	figure	is	based	 on	 the	 income	 earning	 capacity.	 In	 2003,	 lenders	 funded	 the	 U.S.	 housing	market	 predominantly	 based	 on	 asset	 prices	 rather	 than	 on	 an	 income	 earning	capacity.		The	 differences	 between	 these	 two	 methods	 of	 funding	 are	 key	 to	 the	understanding	of	the	financial	crisis.	Households	took	up	the	full	$1.112	trillion	in	new	mortgages	in	2003.	Their	income	growth	could	only	support	 	$325	billion	in	new	mortgage	 debt.	 Their	 future	 “negative”	 income	 impact	 was	 $787	 billion,	 or	$43,211	 per	 each	 new	 home	 built	 in	 2003.	 It	 also	 happens	 to	 be	 equal	 to	 a	 full	year’s	 income	 based	 of	 the	 median	 nominal	 income	 for	 2003.	 Furthermore	 this	phenomenon	 of	 supplying	 the	 housing	market	with	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 funds	 than	income	growth	could	absorb,	started	already	in	1999.	In	1999	$219	billion	was	the	overfunded	amount,	 in	2000	$229	billion,	 in	2001	$369	billion	and	in	2002	$589	billion.	 The	 total	 negative	 income	 impact	 for	 the	 years	 1999-2003	 was	 $2.19	trillion.	 On	 a	 nominal	 median	 income	 of	 $43,318	 in	 2003,	 every	 mortgage	borrower	had	a	negative	future	income	impact	$253,091,	which	nearly	represents	6	years	of	average	earnings.	The	$2.19	trillion	represented	31.7%	of	all	mortgage	debt	 outstanding	 per	 end	 of	 2003.	 To	 express	 this	 in	 other	 terms,	 if	mortgagors	would	have	been	kept	on	 the	mortgage	payments	according	 to	 the	 income	based	funding	method,	their	maturity	of	their	mortgage	would	have	to	be	extended	by	9.5	years	to	39.5	years,	due	to	this	asset	based	mortgage	funding	system.	These	facts	are	based	on	data	from	1999	to	2003.	The	asset	based	funding	cycle	did	not	stop	in	2003	and	went	on	well	into	2007.		A	mortgage	extension	of	nearly	 ten	years	on	average	 indicated	 that	 the	 financial	crisis	 for	 individual	 households	 occurred	 in	 2003.	 This	 was	 well	 before	 the	accelerated	sales	drive	of	subprime	mortgages,	which	started	from	2004,	and	the	extensive	 use	 of	mortgage	 securitization,	which	 also	 started	more	 or	 less	 at	 the	same	time.	An	IMF	Working	paper	of	20131	:	“Securitization:	Lessons	learned	and	the	 road	 ahead”,	 deals	 extensively	 with	 the	 subject	 of	 subprime	 mortgages	 and	their	securitization.																																																									1	https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13255.pdf	
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																																																										How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		In	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008,	 the	 key	 indicator	 which	 was	missed	 or	 not	 acted	 upon	 was	 the	 income	 affordability	 index.	 Average	 median	nominal	 incomes	 of	 households	 in	 the	 U.S.	 went	 up	 by	 17.06%	 over	 the	 period	1997-2003,	while	 the	home	mortgage	debt	grew	by	95.3%	over	 the	same	period	(Q4	1996-Q4	2003).	Even	more	striking	is	the	volume	of	mortgage	funds	allocated	in	 2003.	 If	 the	 entire	 new	mortgage	 lending	 in	 2003	 had	 been	 allocated	 to	 new	housing	starts,	 then	as	 table	2	shows	5.475	million	new	homes	would	have	been	100%	 funded	with	 new	mortgage	money,	 rather	 than	 the	 2.057	million	 actually	started.	 This	 figure	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 house	 prices	 would	 have	moved	up	in	line	with	the	nominal	median	household	income	levels	between	1997	and	2003.	The	5.475	million	new	homes	in	the	U.S.	would	have	meant	that	the	total	housing	 stock	 of	 116	million	 homes	would	 have	 been	 replaced	 in	 21	 years.	 The	average	 life	 span	of	U.S.	homes	 is	difficult	 to	assess,	but	 it	may	well	be	over	100	years	for	newly	constructed	homes.	Again	a	further	indication	that	the	asset-based	mortgage	lending	system	outweighed	the	income	based	method	by	a	great	margin.		Driving	 up	 house	 prices	 through	 mortgage	 lending	 growth,	 far	 in	 excess	 of	 the	nominal	 median	 income	 changes,	 exposes	 all	 mortgagors	 to	 excessive	 risks	 of	default,	especially	the	more	recent	borrowers.				The	 issue	was	that	all	mortgage	 lending	has	effects	on	the	prices	of	homes	–both	existing	 and	 new	 homes-,	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 future	 mortgagors	 to	 get	 onto	 the	property	ladder	and	on	the	quality	of	the	loan	book	outstanding.	Every	year	from	1997	and	later,	 the	gap	between	income	and	asset	based	mortgage	growth	levels	widened	with	 the	 result	 that	5.475	million	homes	 could	have	been	built	 in	2003	with	 the	money	 allocated	 to	 new	mortgage	 lending.	 The	 5.475	million	 are	 far	 in	excess	of	any	potential	housing	demand	based	on	population	growth,	which	runs	at	around	1.6	million	homes	a	year.		Competition	between	banks	does	not	 lead	 to	an	annual	mortgage	 lending	 ceiling	being	applied.	Banks	may	be	the	initial	shock	absorbers,	if	loan	defaults	go	up.	But	individual	households	and	the	whole	economy	suffer	the	most	through	 increased	unemployment	 and	 reduced	disposable	 income	 levels	 as	well	 as	 through	a	 value	loss	on	their	properties.	Those	on	the	 lower	 income	levels	are	the	hardest	hit,	as	they	are	the	most	likely	to	need	to	borrow	a	higher	percentage	of	their	income	in	order	 to	 get	 on	 the	 housing	 ladder.	 The	 effects	 of	 these	 factors	 constitute	 a	systemic	risk	to	the	whole	U.S.	economy.		In	2003,	 short-term	economic	 indicators	were	 all	 positive;	 the	 real	 problem	was	one	of	losing	sight	of	how	mortgage-borrowing	levels	did	affect	future	disposable	income	levels.			
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2.2	The	speed	of	mortgage	lending		One	can	distinguish	two	different	speeds	in	mortgage	lending;	the	first	one	is	the	speed	for	an	individual	household	to	get	a	mortgage	approved.	For	each	individual	this	is	the	most	important	speed.	However	there	is	also	a	macro-economic	speed	in	mortgage	 lending,	 being	 the	 volume	 of	 all	 new	 home	 mortgages	 disbursed	 in	 a	single	year.		In	the	U.S.	in	1997,	the	total	home	mortgage	lending	volume	was	$	341	billion.	By	2003	this	volume	had	increased	to	$1.112	trillion.	The	speed	of	lending	had	more	than	tripled,	to	be	exact	by	326%.		Why	is	such	macro-economic	speed	important?			This	speed	should	be	 linked	to	 income	growth	 levels	of	 individual	households,	 to	population	growth	and	to	changes	in	the	quality	of	desirable	homes.		The	 nominal	 median	 income	 levels	 of	 households	 in	 the	 U.S.	 increased	 from	$37,005	in	1997	to	$43,318	in	2003,	an	increase	in	income	levels	of	17.06%.	The	median	 income	 levels	 are	 calculated	 on	 basis	 that	 half	 of	 the	 numbers	 of	households	earn	less	than	the	median	level	and	the	other	half	earn	more.			The	 second	 element	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 is	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	households	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2003.	 In	 1997,	 there	 were	 102.5	 million	households	 in	 the	 U.S	 and	 by	 2003	 the	 number	 had	 grown	 to	 112	 million;	 a	household	 numbers	 growth	 of	 9.27%	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2003	 or	 nearly	 1.6	million	new	households	each	year.		In	1997,	 the	percentage	of	homes	owned	was	65.7%	of	all	homes	or	67.3	million	homes.	By	2003,	the	ownership	rate	had	gone	up	to	68.6%	of	all	homes	or	76.83	million	homes.	Between	1997	and	2003	11.2	million	new	homes	were	built,	more	than	covering	the	increase	in	home	ownership	rates.		On	nearly	all	accounts,	such	as	the	growing	number	of	new	housing	starts	over	the	period	1997-2003,	the	increase	in	the	percentage	of	households	owning	their	own	home,	the	fact	that	new	housing	starts	outstripped	the	level	of	home	building	for	owner-occupier	transactions,	all	justified	the	belief	that	these	developments	were	signs	of	a	healthy	economic	development.		What	 was	 clearly	 overlooked	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 nearly	 all	 these	 positive	developments	were	only	made	possible,	not	by	households	using	their	own	income	and	 savings	 to	 reach	 these	 goals,	 but	 by	 massively	 extending	 their	 borrowed	money	(mortgage)	obligations.	With	a	nominal	median	income	growth	of	17.06%	over	 the	 period	 1997-2003,	 individual	 households	 increased	 their	 mortgage	borrowing	levels	by	326%	over	the	same	period.		
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																																																																																		How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		In	 the	U.S.	 over	 the	period	1997-2003,	 the	 household	mortgage	debts	 to	 income	levels	were	totally	ignored.	It	should	have	come	as	no	surprise	that	when	massive	amounts	 of	 borrowed	 funds	were	pumped	 into	 the	property	markets	 that	 house	prices	 accelerated	 faster	 than	 in	 previous	 years.	 This	 fact	 provided	 lenders	 and	borrowers	with	 the	 impression	 that	 loans	 to	 values	were	 improving	 rather	 than	declining.	 Such	a	 fata	morgana	misled	most	bankers	and	equally	 the	 supervisory	authorities.		
	
2.3	The	short	term	over	the	long	term		Most	 economists	 focus	 on	 short-term	developments,	 like	 the	next	 quarterly	GDP	growth	figure,	the	monthly	inflation	level,	the	level	of	new	housing	starts,	the	level	of	unemployment	and	the	quarterly	income	growth	data.		In	2003,	U.S	GDP	growth	level	ran	at	2.8%	on	an	annual	basis;	the	unemployment	level	fluctuated	from	5.8%	in	January	to	6.3%	in	June	to	5.7%	by	December	and	the	CPI-U	inflation	levels	started	the	year	at	2.60%	in	January	and	finished	the	year	at	2.27%	in	December.		By	 December	 2003,	 there	 were	 2,057,000	 new	 housing	 starts	 made	 on	 an	annualized	basis	in	the	U.S.		U.S.	 wide	 nominal	 median	 family	 income	 was	 $43,318	 over	 fiscal	 year	 2003	compared	to	$40,696	over	1999.		All	these	short-term	economic	indicators	showed	a	very	respectable	performance.		There	 is	nothing	wrong	with	such	obsession	with	short-term	data	 interpretation.	Economic	models	 are	 built	 around	 such	 short-term	movements.	 However,	 there	are	elements	in	economic	developments,	which	cannot	be	captured	by	short-term	data,	but	have	to	be	studied	with	an	eye	to	the	longer	term.		In	 previous	 papers,	 the	 writer	 has	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 long-term	 risks	 that	home	mortgage	borrowings	levels	can	represent	to	the	disposable	income	levels	of	individual	households.	It	was	demonstrated	that	the	cycle	that	started	in	1997	did	last	to	2017.	Preventive	measures	were	not	taken	in	2003	and	curative	measures	after	2007-2008	did	not	prioritize	saving	households	from	the	damaging	effects	of	a	 fall	 in	 house	 prices	 and	 a	 drop	 in	 incomes.	 Nearly	 all	 banks	 were	 saved,	 but	households	 had	 to	 fence	 for	 themselves,	with	 the	 disastrous	 economic	 results	 of	slow	or	no	growth,	a	complete	breakdown	in	new	housing	starts,	a	doubling	of	the	unemployment	rate	from	some	5%	to	10%	in	18	months	and	a	reduction	back	to	5%,	which	took	some	6	years.	U.S	federal	government	debt	doubled	between	2008	and	2017	from	some	$10	trillion	to	just	over	$20	trillion.		The	 statistics	 in	 section	 1.2	 clearly	 show	 the	 longer-term	 picture,	 which	 is	 that	initially	from	1997	to	2003	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	stimulated	the	U.S.		
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																																																																														How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		economy.	However	below	the	headline	short-term	success,	a	gap	started	to	emerge	between	the	ability	of	households	to	service	mortgage	loans	and	the	actual	average	house	price.	The	latter	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	rapid	increase	in	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	over	the	period	1997-2003.	It	was	not	the	demand	for	homes	that	drove	up	the	average	house	price,	but	the	volume	of	mortgage	funds	that	the	financial	sector	allocated	to	individual	households	per	time	period.	In	2003	the	gap	was	 already	 so	 large	 that	with	 the	mortgage	 funds	disbursed,	 5.475	million	new	homes	 could	 have	 been	 built.	 This	 is	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 allocation	 per	household	 would	 have	 followed	 the	 income-based	 method.	 The	 5.475	 million-supply	 levels	would	 have	 been	 extremely	 excessive,	 considering	 that	 the	 annual	demand	 for	 new	 homes	 in	 the	 U.S.	 hovers	 around	 1.6	million	 units.	 The	 income	based	method	of	mortgage	 funding	 clashed	 in	 a	major	way	with	 the	 asset-based	method	of	financing.		The	 collective	 financial	 sector	 had	 moved	 the	 goal	 posts	 from	 an	 income-based	approach	to	an	asset	based	one.		This	process	did	not	stop	or	was	halted	in	2003,	it	continued	to	well	into	2007.	The	end	 result	was	 that	 over	 the	 period	 2005-2015	 24.475	million	 households	were	confronted	with	 foreclosure	 proceedings.	 This	 represented	 33.3%	 of	 the	 73.580	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	the	spring	of	2008.		In	the	short	term	the	dangers	of	an	asset	based	method	of	funding	were	disguised.	The	 financial	 sector	 complimented	 itself	 on	 making	 higher	 short-term	 profits,	without	 taking	excessive	 risks	 since	average	house	prices	were	 rising.	Banks	did	not	acknowledge	that	house	prices	were	rising	because	of	the	decisions	made	by	the	 collective	 financial	 sector	 itself	 (including	 those	 of	 Fannie	 Mae	 and	 Freddy	Mac).	No	individual	bank	was	the	main	cause	in	funding	excessively	large	mortgage	volumes.	 In	 a	 way,	 it	 was	 and	 still	 is	 a	 system	 malfunction	 that	 can	 only	 be	corrected	by	supervisory	authorities.		The	long-term	effects	started	to	become	clear	by	2006	and	2007,	when	the	level	of	foreclosure	filings	went	up	sharply.	The	income-based	method	of	financing	became	the	only	game	in	town,	once	again.	By	2008,	the	annual	level	of	mortgage	lending	dropped	 sharply	 and	 even	by	2016,	 the	 level	was	only	53%	of	 the	2003	 level	 of	lending.		
	
	
3.	The	fata	morgana	effects	
	
3.1	The	role	of	the	financial	sector	in	mortgage	lending	
	Just	 like	households,	banks	have	to	make	a	 judgment	about	the	borrowers	future	abilities	 to	 repay	a	mortgage	 loan.	As	most	U.S.	mortgages	are	entered	 into	 for	a	period	of	30	years,	such	judgment	requires	a	forecasting	skill	that	relies	more	on		
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																																																																															How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			hope	and	fear	than	on	scientific	insight.	Over	such	period,	bank	management	teams	will	 have	 changed,	 shareholders	 will	 have	 changed	 and	 the	 end	 results	 of	 the	lending	decision	may	only	well	be	known	after	a	substantial	time	period.	An	error	of	judgment	may	only	show	up	after	many	years.		There	is	a	second	element	that	is	even	more	worrying.	The	collective	of	banks	can	make	mortgage	 loans	 available	with	 a	 speed	 –the	 collective	 funds	 lend	 per	 time	period-	which	not	only	influences	the	ability	of	households	to	acquire	a	home,	but	at	 the	 same	 time	 may	 drive	 up	 the	 prices	 of	 existing	 homes	 in	 excess	 of	 the	households’	nominal	income	growth	levels.		There	is	no	mechanism	in	the	competition	level	among	banks	to	stop	such	events	from	happening.	No	single	bank	will	stop	lending	voluntarily	only	to	accommodate	other	banks	to	increase	their	market	share	in	order	to	reach	an	annual	mortgage-lending	 ceiling.	Not	 only	 is	 reaching	 a	 countrywide	mortgage	 lending	 ceiling	 per	time	period	a	task	that	a	competing	banking	sector	will	never	be	able	to	achieve,	what	is	even	less	desirable	is	that	banks	praise	themselves	that	their	loans	to	asset	values	 have	 improved	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 own	 collective	 mortgage	 lending	decisions.		The	 ultimate	 factor	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 2007-2008	 financial	 crisis	 was	 that	banks	transferred,	in	large	volumes,	their	mortgage	loan	risks	to	outside	investors	through	 a	 securitization	 process.	 Those	 individuals	 and	 organizations	 that	made	the	lending	decisions	in	the	first	place	wished	to	be	no	longer	responsible	for	the	outcome	 of	 their	 decisions.	 Securitization	 meant	 that	 long-term	 risks	 were	converted	 into	 daily	 callable	 obligations.	 Betting	 shops	 use	 the	 advertising	catchphrase:	When	the	fun	stops,	stop	betting.	The	fun	stopped	on	August	9,	2007,	when	BNP	Paribas	declared	that	there	was	no	liquidity	in	the	markets	anymore	for	three	of	their	mortgage	backed	investment	funds.			
3.2	The	policy	tools	used.	
	
Interest	rate	setting	
	The	interest	rate	instrument	was	used	as	from	January	2005	to	August	2006,	when	the	effective	Fed	Funds	rate	was	increased	from	2.28%	in	January	2005	to	5.24%	by	August	2006.		Was	this	the	right	decision	for	the	market	circumstances	of	the	mortgage	market?		An	interest	rate	increase	does	two	things	with	regard	to	mortgagors	and	individual	households:	 The	 Fed	 by	 raising	 the	 price	 of	 money	 hoped	 that	 the	 volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	would	 slow	down.	The	data	 in	 table	1	 show	 that	 there	was	no	significant	slow	down	in	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	in	2005	and	2006.	In	a		
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																																																																																	How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			way,	 banks	 devised	 products	 that	 slowed	 down	 the	 immediate	 effects	 of	 such	interest	rate	 increase,	by	offering	100%	and	low	interest	rate	start-up	mortgages	for	 a	 few	 years	 after	 which	 the	 full	 effect	 of	 the	 interest	 rate	 increase	 would	become	felt.		The	second	effect	was	supposed	to	be	on	the	average	house	prices.	The	asset-based	method	of	mortgage	funding	had	gone	on	ever	since	1999.	By	2005,	average	house	prices	far	exceeded	the	income-based	house	ones.		A	short-term	instrument,	like	a	movement	of	the	interest	rate,	cannot	correct	a	long-term	imbalance.	House	prices		did	continue	to	rise	in	2005,	2006	and	2007,	perhaps	at	a	slightly	slower	speed,	but	rate	rise	did	little,	if	anything,	to	close	the	gap	between	the	income	based	and	asset	based	 method	 of	 mortgage	 lending.	 The	 interest	 instrument	 proved	 to	 be	unsuitable	 for	 managing	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 assets	 based	 mortgage	 lending	system	and	the	income	based	one.		
Quantitative	Easing	
	After	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008,	which	was	mainly	a	banking	crisis,	the	Fed	decided	 that	 a	 program	 of	 buying	 up	 government	 bonds	 and	 mortgage	 backed	securities	would	provide	the	financial	markets	with	liquidity	to	help	start	activities	to	promote	economic	growth.	Did	this	help	individual	households?	For	those	with	an	(inflated)	mortgage,	quantitative	easing	did	nothing	for	them	in	the	short	run;	one	 third	 of	 them	 suffered	 from	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 over	 the	 period	 2005-2015.	 The	 side	 effect	 of	 QE	 was	 a	 lowering	 of	 long-term	 interest	 rates	 to	historically	 low	 levels.	 Was	 the	 result	 an	 increase	 in	 mortgage	 borrowing?	 The	answer	was	a	definite	no,	 as	 the	 collective	of	mortgage	borrowers	 lowered	 their	collective	 mortgage	 borrowings	 by	 12%	 between	 Q1	 2008	 and	 Q1	 2015,	 or	 in	amounts	 from	$10.7	 trillion	 to	 $9.4	 trillion.	 	 Again	QE,	 just	 like	 the	 interest	 rate	instrument,	was	an	unsuitable	instrument	to	help	close	the	gap	between	an	asset	based	mortgage	lending	system	and	an	income	based	one.			
3.3	The	policy	instruments	that	would	have	averted	the	financial	crisis	
	
Managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	
	The	main	aim	of	managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	is	to	ensure	that	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	 is	assessed	and	subsequently	adhered	to.	 	Such	ceiling	should	be	kept	in	line	with	the	income-based	mortgage	lending	system.			The	second	aim	 is	 to	 take	countervailing	actions	 in	case	 the	ceiling	 levels	have	been	broken.		It	 is	no	solution	just	to	force	banks	to	improve	their	loan	loss	shock	absorption	capacity	 if	 simultaneously	 no	 steps	 are	 taken	 to	 manage	 a	 mortgage-lending	ceiling.	Systemic	risks	on	households	can	be	avoided	and	in	doing	so,	it	will		
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																																																																											How	the	U.S	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			improve	the	banking	sector’s	profitability	over	existing	home	mortgages.	It	will	also	have	a	positive	spin	off	for	economic	growth	levels	and	for	improving	levels	of	employment	and	incomes	for	individual	households.	The	extensive	use	of	low	interest	rates	and	quantitative	easing	would	not	have	been	needed.		In	 two	 previous	 papers:	 “The	myth	 of	 economic	 growth	 in	 the	 United	 States”2	and	 the	 “A	 review	of	 the	global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 its	 effects	on	working	 class	households-	 a	 tale	of	 vulnerability	and	neglect”3,	 the	 impact	of	not	managing	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	has	extensively	been	discussed.	Also	the	costs	in	terms	of	 lost	 economic	 growth,	 unemployment	 and	 household	 income	 growth,	 the	doubling	of	U.S.	government	debt	and	the	drop	in	homeownership	rates	were	all	set	out.		Two	main	 solutions	were	 suggested.	 One	was	 aimed	 at	 enforcing	 a	mortgage-	lending	ceiling	system:	“A	traffic	light	system	for	the	banking	world”,	indicating	whether	the	speed	of	 lending	was	satisfactory	(green	 light),	was	somewhat	too	fast	(amber	warning)	or	was	excessive	(red	indication).	Violating	the	traffic	rules	would	 incur	 penalties	 for	 banks	 and	 other	 lenders,	 especially	 when	 the	indication	was	red.		The	second	solution	was	for	the	situation	that	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	had	not	been	 enforced.	 In	 such	 case	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 a	 National	 Mortgage	 Bank	 was	recommended	to	help	households	overcome	the	liquidity	squeeze	that	has	made	the	past	decade	show	such	low	economic	growth	rates.	Such	an	NMB	could	act	as	a	 lender	of	 last	 resort	 for	 individual	households	on	basis	of	sharing	part	of	 the	asset	 (the	 home)	 with	 the	 NMB	 for	 its	 cash-flow	 help.	 Such	 help	 should	 be	differentiated	 for	 each	 income	 class	 that	 an	 individual	 household	 belongs	 to.	Low-income	earners	 should	be	helped	most.	 It	 is	 ironical	 that	 in	1936	 the	U.S.	Home	Owners	Loan	Corporation	was	disbanded.	Had	such	a	Corporation	been	in	existence	in	2007-2008,	it	could	have	done	wonders	for	maintaining	the	liquidity	position	for	most	mortgagors	and	even	take	a	subordinated	share	in	the	housing	market,	till	mortgage	lending	levels	were	better	attuned	to	the	nominal	increases	in	median	household	incomes.		Prevention	 by	 2003	 would	 have	 been	 the	 best	 option	 to	 correct	 the	 clash	between	 an	 asset-based	 mortgage	 lending	 system	 and	 an	 income	 based	 one.	Second	best	would	have	been	to	use	the	correction	scheme	from	2007	onwards.			
	
	
	
	
																																																																																																																																															2	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/74904.html	3	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/73502.html	
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4.	Some	conclusions	and	recommendations	
	
• The	 excessive	 level	 of	 mortgage	 funding	 provided	 by	 the	 collective	 U.S.	financial	sector	over	the	period	1997-2003	created	a	large	gap	between	the	assets	based	method	of	mortgage	funding	and	the	income	based	one.		
• The	gap	can	best	be	illustrated	in	that	the	nominal	income	growth	over	the	period	1997-2003	could,	by	2003,	afford	a	mortgage	level	of	$203,089	per	new	home,	while	the	average	house	price	had	gone	up	to	$246,300.		
• The	gap	can	also	be	illustrated	in	that	in	2003	the	new	mortgage	lending	of	$1.112	 trillion	 would	 have	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 build	 5.475	 million	 new	homes	 on	 a	 100%	mortgage	 basis,	 if	 the	 $203,089	mortgage	 level	 would	have	been	followed.	The	5.475	million	new	homes	were	3.4	times	the	level	of	 demand,	 which	 can	 be	 assessed	 at	 1.6	 million	 new	 homes	 based	 on	population	growth	and	other	factors.		
• The	economic	history	of	the	U.S.	and	other	countries	has	shown	that	in	case	of	excessive	mortgage	lending,	which	causes	house	prices	to	rise	faster	than	income	growth	can	follow,	the	only	real	fall	back	situation	is	on	household’s	incomes.	If	the	fall	back	has	to	depend	on	the	value	of	housing	assets	then	the	drop	in	house	prices	deepen	the	recessionary	trends.		
• In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 U.S.	 this	 fall	 back	 on	 incomes	 involved	 24.475	 million	households	 who	 were	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 started	against	 them	 over	 the	 period	 2005-2015;	 this	 represented	 33.3%	 of	 all	73.58	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	the	spring	of	2008.	By	all	accounts	 a	 shocking	 verdict	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 banks	 to	 predict	 income	growth	of	individual	households.		
• In	 2003	 or	 in	 later	 years	 the	 authorities	 –Fed	 and	 other	 regulatory	authorities-	did	not	 act	upon	 the	growing	gap	between	asset	based	house	funding	and	the	income	based	one.	Neither	an	interest	rate	adjustment	nor	the	Quantitative	Easing	program	was	directed	to	close	the	gap	between	the	effects	of	 an	 asset	based	mortgage-lending	program	and	an	 income	based	one.		
• In	 2003,	 the	 obvious	 solution	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 ceiling	 was	 not	considered	 necessary,	 as	 the	 prevailing	 philosophy	 was	 that	 markets	 do	sort	themselves	out.	The	cause	of	the	crisis:	the	growing	gap	between	asset	prices	and	income	levels	was	not	seen	as	a	danger	as	the	philosophy	did	not	take	into	account	the	annual	volumes	of	borrowed	funds	allocated	and	to	be	repaid	out	of	future	incomes.		
• By	 2007-2008	 the	 support	 devised	 to	 help	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 grow	 again,	was	based	on	providing	liquidity	to	the	financial	markets,	initially	to	the		
	 16	
																																																																																				How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			 ailing	 banks	 and	 subsequently	 to	 the	 government	 and	 mortgage-backed	bond	 markets.	 No	 liquidity	 support	 scheme	 was	 developed	 that	 was	directed	to	individual	households	with	a	mortgage.		
• In	 conclusion,	 the	 U.S.	 household	 mortgage	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	prevented	by	2003,	or	avoided	 to	a	 large	degree	by	2007-2008.	The	2016	indications	are	that	with	an	average	house	price	in	December	of	$384,000	,		the	 gap	 between	 the	 asset	 based	 and	 income	 based	 mortgage	 lending	system	is	growing	again.	Actions	may	need	to	be	taken.		
	
5.	Sources	and	methodologies	used	in	tables	1,	2	and	3		Table	1,	column	1	shows	the	actual	level	of	new	mortgage	lending	from	1996	to	2016.	 This	 level	 is	 abstracted	 from	 the	 Balance	 Sheet	 of	 Households	 and	Nonprofit	Organizations4	as	published	by	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis.	Year-end	data	have	been	used.	To	complete	the	data,	an	estimate	of	the	average	annual	 repayment	 obligations	 has	 been	 made	 on	 basis	 of	 an	 average	 30-year	repayment	 period	 and	 an	 equal	 annual	 repayment	 amount.	 Table	 1,	 column	 2	shows	the	annual	housing	starts,	again	as	published	by	the	Fed	of	St.	Louis.5	The	data	 are	 based	 on	 December	 figures	 annualized.	 Table	 1,	 column	 3	 shows	 the	average	U.S.	home	sales	price	as	published	by	the	U.S	Census	Bureau6.	The	data	show	the	December	data	for	each	respective	year.	Table	1,	column	4	shows	the	Median	 Household	 Nominal	 Income	 levels,	 again	 published	 by	 the	 Fed	 of	 St.	Louis7.	 The	 data	 used	 are	 the	 year-end	 figures.	 Table	 1,	 column	 5	 shows	 an	approach	to	establish	an	income	based	mortgage-lending	program.	For	instance,	the	 1996	 actual	 average	 U.S.	 home	 sales	 price	 is	 used	 as	 base	 and	 the	 1997	average	 nominal	 income	 is	 divided	 by	 the	 1996	 income	 average	 to	 show	 the	increased	 level	 of	 debt	 absorption.	 This	 percentage	 increase	 is	 applied	 to	 the	1996	 average	 homes	 sales	 price	 to	 establish	 the	 income-based	 average	 house	price	for	1997	and	so	on.																																																												Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	22nd	February	2017		4	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HMLBSHNO	5https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUSET	6https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf	7	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA646N				
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